African Indigenous Languages and the Advancement of African Philosophy by Ibanga, Diana-Abasi
African Indigenous Languages and the 
Advancement of African Philosophy 
 
by 
 
Emmanuel Bassey Eyo, Ph.D.  
Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar,  
Cross River State, Nigeria  
 
& 
 
Diana-Abasi Ibanga   
Centre for Environmental Governance and Resource Management, Nigeria; 
 Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar,  
Cross River State, Nigeria  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The contention raised in this research is to showcase that indigenous African languages are 
imperative tools in advancing African philosophy and thought. Therefore it is argued that by 
extension the beginnings and originality of African philosophical thought is best advanced when 
it is vocalized and transliterated in the mother tongue of the philosopher, second, that when 
African philosophical thought is done and articulated in language foreign to the philosopher, 
philosophical thought is weakened within the conceptual expression and foundation, and third, 
that indigenous languages would address perennial problems of inadequacies of languages 
especially where there are no direct replacements of concepts and terms to explain reality and 
other states of affairs.  
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Introduction 
 
There are contentions among philosophers of language and philosophers of mind on the 
distinction between philosophy of language and language of philosophy. This contention is 
perennial in most researches and scholarly advancement in African philosophy, which implies 
that language is important to philosophical discourse. This is because in the study and 
development of philosophy, language plays a major role as a vehicle of philosophical reasoning 
pattern. Loveday presents Aristotle’s postulation on language as that which expresses our 
thought and reality. 
 
 
Language is important because knowledge does not consist of a mute 
mystical insight, but in the ability to discourse intelligently about the 
world. Language must have the same structure as thought, for how else 
could we put our thought into word (Loveday, 72). 
 
 
The importance of language as a vehicle of thought and as expression of reality has also been 
emphasized by Martin Heidegger. In fact, Heidegger (2000) views language as that which makes 
thought and that which reveals reality (or being) in its most authentic form.     
 
 
... and we seek to win back intact the naming force of language and 
words; for words and language are not just shells into which things are 
packed for spoken and written intercourse. In the word, in language, 
things first come to be and are (Heidegger 2000, p.15). 
 
 
Correct use of language is critical, Heidegger says, if one must describe reality in its most 
authentic form. And to do this, one must go back to the indigenous usage of the concepts through 
which reality is described. It was for this reason that Heidegger began his analysis of being by 
examining the concept in the indigenous language of the ancient Greek philosophers.  
 
In African philosophical tradition, recourse is not conceded to the need to use African indigenous 
languages as a fundamental instrument in the development and advancement of African 
philosophy. The major argument against the necessity to produce African philosophy in African 
indigenous languages is aptly presented in the assertion below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
209 
 
Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.12, no.5, November 2018 
 
Language is human non-instinctual act which is learnt. It is a means of 
communicating ideas and thought: for language to be meaningful it must 
follow laid down rule of structure. It must be composed of words which 
in turn are put into sentences expressing some thought (Ozumba 2004, 
p.18). 
 
 
This excerpt of Ozumba opens up the problem of non-usage of African indigenous language in 
the advancement of African philosophy. The argument is that African philosophy can be done in 
any language, since language is learnt. This is the starting point of my argument in this paper. Is 
it possible for the philosopher to present the picture of reality as he sees it, in the language other 
than that which is immediate to him? Addressing this problem is critical to the development and 
advancement of African philosophy in the 21st century. 
 
 
Language and Meaning 
 
Language and meaning are critical to the development of philosophy. Language is a system of 
words that communicate certain meaning. Language and meaning are intrinsically interrelated; 
there cannot be language without associative meaning. Godfrey Ozumba (2018) defines language 
as “strings of words arranged syntactically and semantically for the sole purpose of 
communicating ideas, thoughts, moods, and for explaining action or inaction” (p.2). This means 
that language is a system that contains notion or symbols which allows a person to describe a 
phenomenon, perform an action, inform an audience and explain a thing. But language can also 
lead to misinformation and misdirection of another deliberately or otherwise (Essien 2010). That 
is why Emmanuel Eyo (2008) avers that language should be used in its correct logical context in 
other to communicate the intended meanings. Using language in its correct logical context goes 
beyond mere logical placement of phrases and logical connectives as was advocated by the 
logical atomists; it has to do with the ideas or thoughts that are embedded in it. John Austin 
(1962) observes that “words do not have fixed independent meanings but get their meanings 
from the sentence in which they feature” (p.28). This means that the meaning of language could 
be gleaned from the sentences displayed in either written or oral forms. But equally language 
gathers meanings from the moods of the users. If one does away with this dimension, language 
loses its flavour and renders meaning obscure even to the native speakers (Asouzu 2007). 
Despite this, the audience may attach differential meanings to the words in a way that is different 
from to the usage of the speaker. Hence, the speaker must be sensitive to the audience (Eyo 
2008) and the etymological underpinning of words in a language (Ozumba 2018). And these 
etymological underpinnings are best understood and used by the native speakers than any 
outsider could do.  
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How does this matter to philosophy? Ozumba (2004) informs us that it is language that makes 
philosophy possible. This means that philosophy is impossible without language. This is because 
philosophy is concerned with truth, ideas, concepts, knowledge and reality, which are best 
apprehended with language.  
 
 
Language therefore matters to philosophy because everything concerning 
the activity of man originates in thought (thinking about ideas). But ideas 
must be verbalised to make meaning. Language and non-instinctive 
method of communicating ideas, feelings and desires, by means of a 
system of sound symbols, needs to be externalised for its semantic import 
to be realized (Ozumba 2004, p.119). 
 
 
This brings us into the heart of this discourse. In what language must a philosopher communicate 
his ideas – is it in indigenous or in foreign language? This question is critical to the development 
of philosophy, albeit, African philosophy.  
 
 
African Philosophy and Indigenous Languages 
 
It is incorrect to say that philosophy started with the Greeks. It is not also true to claim that 
philosophy is wholly Western or European. In the realm of knowledge acquisition rudimentary 
ideas are attached to geographical demarcations. In world histories, there are English, Greek, 
German, Chinese, African and other historical creations that distinctly reveal that philosophy and 
its language should be culture based. This is the reason most Western scholars and philosophers 
concentrated on viewing realities from their cultural perspectives. The languages of writing and 
recording were cultural and societal based. However, at the epochal study of philosophy, most of 
the opinions and contentions were not handed down in other languages except the authors’ native 
languages. The issue is how did other people and nations understand their opinions and 
worldviews? It was through translations. This implies that people who became interested had to 
study the language of these authors and cultures to enable them to inform and communicate with 
others. These are the traditions, histories and evolutions of philosophies. 
 
In African philosophy, not much emphasis has been placed on the importance of language in 
transmitting African philosophy. Many African scholars believe that language is not really an 
essential component of the art of doing African philosophy. In fact, Ozumba (2015) avers that:  
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African philosophies do not have to decolonize the basic concepts of 
philosophy or employ African languages in order to establish the 
originality of African philosophy... The use of concepts coined in a 
Western language does not mean that African interpretation cannot be 
unrobed using foreign concepts (p.172, 182). 
 
 
That is to say, there is no need to do African philosophy in indigenous languages because foreign 
languages have developed enough to accommodate African philosophical thought. In fact, those 
who desire to do African philosophy in indigenous languages have to recognize that serious work 
needs to be done on African indigenous languages to enable firmly established philosophical 
conceptualisation (Ozumba 2015). A more radical position was taken by John Tucker (1981) 
who declared that language was not an “expression of inner life”. He argues that:  
 
 
The sole function of language could not be that of making public some 
private event which is the meaning of what is uttered or written down... In 
speaking and writing we are not ‘expressing our inner life’, rather, we are 
engaging in a social setting, with an aim which is understood by the 
participants (Tucker 1981, p.19).  
 
 
In other words, the role of language is to enable wider participation in a philosophical discourse 
and not necessarily to communicate meanings. If language does not serve to publicize the 
thought of the philosopher, then it would be useless insisting that African philosophers should do 
philosophy in indigenous languages. What they should do is express their ideas in globally 
enfranchised languages of the colonialists “for ease of cross-cultural understanding” (Ozumba 
2015, p.182).  
 
The Nigerian philosopher Innocent Asouzu also takes a similar view. His argument is that the 
advocacy to do African philosophy in African indigenous languages would rather undermine the 
growth and advancement of African philosophy. According to him, “all who are involved in a 
communication process always leave out something un-communicated and always have 
something to learn from each [other]” (Asouzu 2007, p.183). For him, “in all situations involving 
human beings, no meaning is complete or perfect and the same can be said of meaning thereby 
intended” (Asouzu 2007, 182). Asouzu (2007) further argues that meaning does not become 
clearer because it has been transliterated in either foreign or native language and that 
philosophical reasoning “transcends language itself” (Asouzu 2007, p.185).  
 
 
 
212 
 
Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.12, no.5, November 2018 
He maintains that in order to effectively communicate philosophical meanings, philosophical 
ideas have to be seen as missing links and held as being complementary to ideas in other 
linguistic traditions (Asouzu 2007, p.182). In other words, what one communicates in his native 
language is only half truth until such is complemented in foreign languages. It is here evident 
that Asouzu appears to pin the authenticity of African philosophy to the linguistic configurations 
of Western and Eastern philosophies.   
 
But the point advocated in this paper is that, for African philosophy to advance, African 
philosophers must start writing in indigenous African languages. The point we raise here is that 
doing African philosophy in African indigenous languages would not disenfranchise African 
philosophical thoughts. And in doing African philosophy in indigenous languages the African 
philosopher would be articulating African ideas in authentic manner. The role of the African 
philosopher is to examine basic assumptions, prevalent opinions and doctrines in African society 
in order to awaken the consciousness in the society towards authentic living. But in doing this, 
“the philosopher must employ the language which the people understand and use” (Ogunmodede 
1998, p.5) in order to make them interested, informed and willing participants in the discourse 
and to effectively communicate his or her ideas to the society. This means that language of 
philosophizing matters. This importance is expressed thus: 
 
 
“Language of African philosophy” is intended not just for the African 
matters and issues that an African philosopher analyzes but also the 
chosen instrument of his critical analysis or interpretation, as well as the 
meaningful transmission, understanding and relevance of his findings to 
his society (Ogunmodede 1998, p.8). 
 
 
The language in how one does philosophy matters because it serves as the instrument for 
analysis and interpretation as well as for effective transmission to the intended society. Language 
of doing philosophy is quite essential because philosophy is culture-bound. It is for this reason 
philosophies in Europe and Asia are expressed in the indigenous languages of those societies. In 
China, Germany, France, Britain, and Russia their philosophers express their philosophical 
thoughts in Chinese, German, French, English and Russian, respectively. There has not been an 
occasion where a Chinese philosopher or German philosopher transmitted his philosophical 
knowledge in Efik, Annang or Akan language. They always express their thoughts in their native 
tongue. The reason for this is not far-fetched. The ideas of these philosophers are rooted in the 
conceptual frameworks in their cultural settings and, thus, can only be authentically expressed in 
the language of those cultures. In addition, the philosophers are aware that they are analyzing 
cultural issues, to that extent that they are also addressing the people in their societies. To do this, 
therefore, in a language foreign to their societies would undermine the capacity of their 
philosophical ideas to achieve the intended purposes.  
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The African philosopher cannot afford to deviate from this course or pattern. African episteme is 
embedded in African indigenous languages. Several aphorisms, concepts, ideas, notions, idioms, 
and principles that the African philosopher uses to do African philosophy are embedded in the 
wider corpus of African languages, and their meanings are best expressed in those indigenous 
languages. Moreover, the African philosopher does his or her thinking in his native language but 
only translates it into foreign language when he or she transliterates into written form. A number 
of scientific studies have demonstrated that thinking is done essentially in the indigenous 
language of the thinker. Even when one is quite fluent in foreign language, he or she does his or 
her thinking in the native language that he or she was born. Therefore, one can say that an 
African philosopher of Efik origin basically does his or her philosophical thinking in Efik 
language. When he or she transliterates his or her thought into written form with foreign 
language, he or she barely translates the thought from his or her native language to the foreign he 
or she is transmitting the thought. In doing this, the philosopher crosses language paradigms and 
incurs problems in the process. William Quine refers to this problem in his theory of 
indeterminacy of translation. In the second assumption, he held that “there exists the possibility 
that sentences exist in one language without its equivalent in another language” (Ozumba 2002, 
p.77). The logic and conceptual framework that defines one language may differ from that of 
other languages. For example, between Annang and Ibibio languages there exist some semantic 
differences. Basically, there is no ‘L’ expression in Ibibio language whereas there is the ‘L’ 
alphabet in Annang language. Hence, the Annang thinker would experience serious difficulty 
transliterating his or her L-endowed thought into Ibibio language; much of the transliterated 
thought would lose meaning. Ozumba also makes similar observations about Igbo and English 
languages. 
 
 
The way we key our sentences to non-verbal stimulations in Igbo 
language and that in English language are similar but at the same time the 
inward appreciation at times differs. When in Igbo language we see a 
Rabbit, the non-verbal stimulation may both in English and Igbo 
necessitate the words “there goes the Rabbit” and ‘ne-Oke-Oyibo’ 
respectively. But in Igbo, because the presence of rabbit signifies one 
thing or the other, while the Igbo language user may really be focusing 
his attention on the superstitious implication of rabbit’s appearance, the 
English language speaker may be concerned with the mere literal 
presence of rabbit. And in either language the stimulation and the 
utterance take the same dimension but not the same signification 
(Ozumba 2002, p.77-78). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
214 
 
Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.12, no.5, November 2018 
Martin Heidegger (2000) also made the following observation: 
 
 
In the age of the first and definitive unfolding of Western philosophy 
among the Greeks, when questioning about being as such and as a whole 
received its true inception, beings were called phusis. This fundamental 
Greek word for beings is usually translated as “nature”. We use the Latin 
translation natura, which really means “to be born”, “birth”. But with this 
Latin translation, the originary content of the Greek word phusis is 
already thrust aside, the authentic philosophical naming force of the 
Greek word is destroyed. This is true not only of the Latin translation of 
this word but all other translation of Greek philosophical language into 
Roman. This translation of Greek into Roman was not an arbitrary and 
innocuous process but was the first stage in the isolation and alienation of 
the originary essence of Greek philosophy (p.14). 
 
 
What this means is that the picture of reality viewed from the lenses of different languages may 
present different meanings that are valid within the axiomatic system of the languages. To 
translate this into another language would cause substantial loss of meaning, the very ingredient 
of the philosophical thought. This is what Quine was talking about with his theory of 
indeterminacy of translation. The African philosopher who ignores these axiomatic boundaries 
may essentially be committing what Mesembe Edet (2015) refers to as “descriptive chauvinism” 
– that is, the tendency of assuming that concepts from other philosophical traditions ask similar 
questions and construct responses as one’s own. In fact, there is often the problem of 
incommensurability incurred when an African philosopher adopts the axioms in the foreign 
linguistic tradition to express the thought he obviously conceived in his native language. Edet 
(2015) notes that this was the difficulty Kwasi Wiredu faced in attempt to decolonize the concept 
of truth. 
 
 
… [W]hat Wiredu discovered in his effort at decolonizing the concept of 
“Truth” … [was] that his native Akan, correlate the word “truth”, 
nokware, with a primarily moral connotation rather than a cognitive 
conception of truth [as it is obtained in European tradition] (Edet 2015, 
p.211). 
 
 
This can also be said about akpaniko, Efik correlates of truth, whose connotation differs with 
European conception. Therefore, when one transliterates this concept, akpaniko, into English, 
such may be laden with inconsistencies in connotations and ultimately a definitive 
misunderstanding of the concept. In so doing, the African philosopher may have misled his 
audience. 
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Conclusion 
 
The point emphasized in this paper is that, for African philosophy to advance, African 
philosophers must start writing in indigenous African languages. The African philosophers 
should not worry about the capacity of the indigenous languages to transmit their ideas to a wider 
audience. They should know that those who are interested in their ideas would seek out ways to 
translate them into their own languages. It is not writing their philosophical thoughts in English 
or French that will stimulate people’s interests in their work. Great ideas can never be hidden 
away for long in “obscure” languages. There will always be people who will seek them out. 
Already much of ujamaa philosophy was written in Swahili language by Julius Nyerere. Yet it is 
widely studied. Thiong’o’s works that were published in indigenous languages are being 
translated and studied. The scriptures that are foreign to us were written in Aramaic, Hebrew, 
Greek and Latin. African theologians and believers were compelled to learn those languages 
before translating same to us. And the scriptures are being translated into different African 
indigenous languages. It is instructive that African philosophers have adequately raised issues 
about the cosmos, God, humanity, morals, ideas and other phenomena. But these views and ideas 
can only be sustained and advanced by using African indigenous languages. In this direction, 
Efik philosophy, Igbo philosophy, Yoruba philosophy, and Hausa philosophy should first be 
written in those languages before their translations to foreign languages. This is the only sure 
way of communicating African philosophy.  
 
We suggest that African philosophers should initiate means of developing their indigenous 
languages to enable foreigners interested in learning such indigenous languages. African 
philosophies should be written, documented and imparted in indigenous African languages. 
Philosophy students should be encouraged to learn, write and philosophize in African indigenous 
languages.   
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